Schmedlap
AS I noted in our (rather extended) discussion of Alexander Haig, culture is too me an incredibly complicated phenemenon: on the one hand, capable of explaining nearly (if not) everything, on the other hand, incapable if being defined with nearly if any precision.
In contrasat to our Haig discussion, I shall (at least initially) be brief. I agree that we are probably transposing institutions on a culture that probably is not ready for them. What that means, however, is open to interpretation. What is a culture? A certain level of socioeconomic development? Or something different? Your comparison of Britain and France, which within the grand scheme of things are fairly akin to the United States in that respect, suggest that culture is more than socioeconomic development. But that is far too much, perhaps, when comparing a country like Afghanistan with a country like the United States.
So, first, I'll do what I do best: list a bunch of books. First, Samuel Huntington's "Political Order in Changing Societies" suggests, I think, if I interpret it correctly, that transposing institutions upon newly-developing countries (to be politically correct, and for a book composed in the 1960s), should be sufficient to bring them to modernity. Joel Migdal's "Strong Societies and Weak States" suggests that this view is wrong: societies can trump states. Two other works come to mind: Rosberg and Jackson's "World Politics" article, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," World Politics, 1982, which claims that many African states superficially resemble Western states while really failing to meet their standards. (I'm reminded of the anecdote in Dana Priest's "The Mission" of Nigeria's quest for F-16s.) Finally, I'd suggest a look at James Q. Wilson's, "Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do And Why They Do It" and, at a minimum, its chapter on culture. Finally, for culture within a specific domain, and one with which I think you're familiar, I'd read Robert Kagan's "Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law."
To answer your question, rather than compile a bibliography that I doubt you have the time (and quite possibly the inclination) to engage, I'd answer in the affirmative. I lack enough knowledge to comment with sufficient confidence with respect to precisely how we are structuring the ANA/ANP. But I imagine we are, in Stanley Karnow's title, creating something "in our image." Isn't it a traditional SF mission to create culture-specific militaries? But my impression (admittedly highly impressionistic and anecdotal) is that (1) SF is inclined toward DA missions, (2) SF is not scalable for a task of this size, and (3) the US seeks, in Dr. Nagl's words, to transform Afghanistan's entire society. One works from what is known, and what does the US know better than itself? Hence quasi-bootcamp for those who, based on what I've seen on Youtube, cannot perform basic jumping jacks (Iraq) or pushups (Afghanistan). Admittedly, these are exteme examples, perhaps, and limited to a specific domain (recruit training), but they may be symptomatic of a larger phenomenon. I'd be very interested in a comparative study of the difficulties (or ease) of building an IA and INP, comparatively literate and drug-free (surely aspects of culture), versus doing the same with respect to the ANA and ANP.
Whether the institutions transposed are optimal is a deceptively tricky question. The initial answer is of course an emphatic, "No!" At the same time, if there is no viable alternative - and what would be the appropriate analogue? the North Vietnamese Army circa 1964 as a similar albeit successful third world army? - than what else to tranpose than the American model.
ADTS
I recognize this may read somewhat disjointed, but hopefully it will make sense. First off, keep in mind when it comes to nation building, countries bordering a failed or fragmented state will always exert significant influence for their own selfish reasons. This becomes clearer within the context of Pakistan in particular, certainly Iran, and to a lesser extent India. The point being, it may be close to impossible to nation build a country like Afghanistan when its neighbors try to keep it fragmented or support only a particular culturally similar group to their own. Having stated the forgoing (so it is in the back of everyone's mind), I will ask what is America's idea or concept of a nation? Is it an ethnic group or race who have a shared history to include religion, language, and traditions? One could certainly make the case this is indeed called a culture, but not necessarily a nation. So, having thrown all this out, let me ask a another question to continue the discussion: how did America's original 13 colonies comes together each having such diverse cultural origins, and in the process form an army - an army formed from colonial militias I will remind you.
I want to avoid spoiling the broth by injecting my thoughts for now. I'll just inject some clarifications...
Culture = values, norms, and beliefs. It is not socioeconomic or ethnic. France has a culture that transcends race or religion, for example (the current controversy regarding Islam is not a rejection of Islam so much as defending secularism as a tenet of their culture). Last I knew, they were not even allowed to ask about race or religion in their census.
Regarding Huntington's views on transposing systems onto societies, see the recent changes in the views held by the World Bank regarding whether development can occur by building infrastructure or building political systems. I know Ashraf Ghani hit on this in the later chapters of Fixing Failed States. Off the top of my head, I can't think of another reference.
On the issue of training ANA/ANP, it's more than just SF doing this. Tons of CF are doing this as well.
For definition of nation, I'd recommend the Gellner definition, which is pretty close to what General Observer posted above (add in connection to a piece of land and I think that completes it).
Any anthropologists or sociologists out there, feel free to correct me.
Schmedlap:
I think your definition of culture is a good one, but illustrates the difficulty of defining it. What about behavior rather than simply mental constructs, though? It is acceptable in America (part of American culture) for Americans to X; it is unacceptable (against French culture) for French people to X. Again, this is inextricable tied with what you mentioned - ideational phenomena - but whether one should lump behavior in with ideational phenomena seems to me an open question.
I have not read "Fixing Failed States," but think I am familiar with their position, and the general position, on doing so. In two words: institutions matter. The general trend is to focus on the institutions that (so far as can be told) foster economic growth, rather than focusing on economic growth per se. As long as we're naming books, I might as well name one more: "Seeing Like a State," by James Scott, who I think doubles as an anthropologist (probably by courtesy appointment). Be that as it may, his thesis is, to summarize a 500-page book, that top-down attempts to transpose universal institutions onto local cultures and institutions (e.g., cities or countries) fail, because they fail to take into account local idiosyncrasies.
I recognize that more than just SF are training ANA/ANP. My sentence was intended to acknowledge this.
I think General Observer's question is a phenomenal one. I've often though of it in terms of, "How did the US Army get from an institution in which its pivotal battle was won through the orders of an English professor, to a professional full-time institution and bureaucracy?" (And if you know of books that answer the question, I'd be thrilled to know their name.) In other words, I'm not sure <b> how <b> integrated the Continental Army was. The Civil War was fought, so far as I know, largely by regiments raised by states, fighting as such (eg, the 20th Maine Rifles or 54th Massachusetts Rifles). My understanding of the early American union is that it was tenuous and not necessarily certain to endure. High school history reminds me of the potential (actuality?) during the War of 1812 for the Northeast to break away. A further great question might be, do militaries build states - Israel might be an example of this; its military allows for integration of an incredibly diverse population - or do states build militaries - hence, third world countries have third militaries. To return once more to General Observer's question, though, perhaps one (we?) ought to examine more closely the role of von Steuben and other advisors and observers in creating the American army. And I'd be curious how different American colonial-culture was from British culture? (I'm guessing I think the difference was smaller than Schmedlap does, because I tend to think in some cases - eg, here in the US - cultural differences tend to be exaggerated, but my word is, to put it mildly, hardly definitive.)
I wish I were an anthropologist or sociologist (actually, I don't, really), but sadly, I'm not.
Keep stirring the pot.
ADTS
Many political scientists draw a sharp distinction between the concepts of state and nation. A state refers to government and other institutions which run a country. In contrast, a nation is a psychological characteristic; what individuals identify with. Using the example of France is be correct, but a better understood example by Americans would be the UK which comprises four nations, the English, Irish, Scottish, and Welsh (much of colonial America's ancestry in the beginning). All whom look to London to provide prosperity and security, but have their own identity...and in one case, their own predominant religion. Keeping this all in mind as we go forward in the discussion: can nation building be imposed from outside and whether the answer is yes, can or should it be done by the military?
I'm a player Schmedlap. I don't want to spoil the broth of my soup that I'm going to serve at your table either!
I'll toss this question out there for the group.
Are the policies of transforming other cultures and winning the "hearts and minds" of a population sufficient to achieve our national interest or are they a paternalistic, overconfident, elitist concept derived from past colonial experiences? Personally, I go back and forth between the two depending on my mood.
Interestingly, Anna Simons, my anthropologist at NPS, refused to allow us to use the word "culture" in class or in our writings. She believes that term is erroneous and limiting to truly understanding people.
MikeF informs us that Professor Simons finds the word culture to be erroneous? Who would have thought! May I substitute the word "scheme" instead, and further say that over time different schemes were brought about by their perceptions of their social surroundings which have come to make them distinctly different, and in some cases downright unique to other schemes? MikeF further asks another interesting question on whether we take a paternalist approach toward other schemes? Of course we do! In expanding our own country westward, we subjugated the local inhabitants and decided where and how they would live.... well into the 20th Century, to include mandating they attend special boarding schools to "educate" the Indian out of them. I wonder what a Pashtun father thinks, when we build a school house, and expect his daughter to go?
Just curious, was Simons' objection to the term due to the inability to understand people at the personal or small group level? I could understand that. If someone were trying to understand me or how I behave, then thinking in terms of "American culture" would not be much help. But in the big picture, if we are looking at how Americans in general form opinions as groupings of millions of people, I don't know why it would be all that problematic. I wonder if her objection was partly due to the fact that "culture" is often not defined by the person using it, so it invites confusion (which is why I interjected to give a definition) and because there is generally not one culture for a group (think of, in the US, southern culture as opposed to New England). For the last couple years that I was in the Army, I was fortunate to have spoken with DoD-employed anthropologists/sociologists and I remember more than one defining culture as "values, norms, and beliefs" and when they used this abbreviated definition as a tool, it seemed useful. I guess a full explanation of that would require a lengthy response. That said, Simons' take is definitely reason to pause and think about it some more. I remember reading her work before 9/11. I suspect her brain weighs a few more pounds than mine.
"Are the policies of transforming other cultures and winning the "hearts and minds" of a population sufficient to achieve our national interest or are they a paternalistic, overconfident, elitist concept derived from past colonial experiences?"
I'll just throw my initial reaction to that question out. It combines a lot of words and concepts into two dichotomous sentences. For example, I might agree that the policies are elitist, but not derived from past colonial experience. Also, do you mean "intended to be" between "population" and "sufficient"?
I can't judge a lot of these questions for the simple reason that I haven't been there, or done that. That said, it seems to me advising seems much more robust and culturally-sensitive than prior (read:Vietnam) attempts.*,** But Vietnamm is admittedly an n of 1, so to speak. What to me seems like more appropriate analogues might be the American attempts to construct armies in, say, the Banana Wars or the Philippines - or perhaps, instead, the Huk Rebellion, or any of the British attempts to raise colonial armies (even today, according to Wikipedia, the Gurkhas' curriculum includes a block on Western culture). (These are book topics, by the way, any potential authors out there.) Those (circa 1900-1940) might have been paternalistic, and those might have been more paternalistic and elitist times, but my general sense, based on my limited reading of the original Small Wars Manual, is that the Marines were attuned to being culturally savvy. The tension Mike F notes, though, is certainly present, I imagine. To make an army, you have to change a group's behavior, which may contradict their values, beliefs, and norms. The extent to which making an army, which involves changing behavior, engages with changing a nation, I leave to others for right now.
Please keep stirring.
ADTS
*That said, General Observer's point about a school is a very good one.
** CAP Marines and SF notwithstanding.
Missed this on the first go round. Mike, I think you asked the wrong question (or, alternatively, if you phrased the question accurately then this is an indication that we're going about things the wrong way).
Are the policies of transforming other cultures and winning the "hearts and minds" of a population sufficient to achieve our national interest...
Our policy should not be to transform a culture. Culture is not the root cause of failed states, but it is the human context in which any plans must be laid. If we were truly "nation building" in the real sense of the phrase (I find that term more problematic than culture) then changing the culture might be part of that hopeless objective. But our "nation building" efforts are really "state building" which, while also fairly hopeless, imo, is slightly less impossible than nation building because state building assumes a culture and works with it, whereas nation building might include altering the culture and/or working against it and simultaneously building a state.
Interestingly, Anna Simons, my anthropologist at NPS, refused to allow us to use the word "culture" in class or in our writings. She believes that term is erroneous and limiting to truly understanding people.
I think the problem is that "culture" is often used in the same way as "terrorism." It has a tendency to mean all things to all people. When either term is given a clear meaning, I think this problem goes away.
""nation building" efforts are really "state building" which, while also fairly hopeless, imo, is slightly less impossible than nation building"
This is correct in the abstract. Yes, in the abstract, one can build a state, while in the abstract, it would be much harder if not impossible to construct the cultural components of a nation. But, first, I'm curious where state building has been successful over the past 50 years, and whether examples profferred are simply nation states that have institutional legacies (eg, the post-Soviet states) upon which to draw. I'm sure the World Bank and its peers can put together glossy brochures of states that have been built. I'm more interested in the quasi-large-n entire sample of African states that not only have been built, but also those which have failed over the past x years.
With respect to nation-building - and we still havent' specified whether nation-building is a necessary and sufficient condition for state-building (or vice-versa?) - I'd pay close attention to myths and legends. Read Lisa Wedeen's "Ambiguities of Domination," on the myths that surrounded Hafez al-Assad, and the uses to which they were put. In the US, Washington was...How does one *willingly* and *knowingly* construct myths that bind a nation together *intentionally*? Or do such myths come about as a cause of something preexisting? Can one create such myths instrumentally?
Ultimately, perhaps we are arguing over whether materialist factors (perhaps found in state-building) trump ideational factors (perhaps found in nation-building) in the formation of a polity (a nation-state)?
ADTS
Not sure why you condition your question on "over the past 50 years." The last 50 years has been a transition between Western and Soviet domination and the redrawing of borders as the world readjusts to the end of the Cold War. Thinking a little farther back, but not too far...
Italy - the state was built before the nation. "We have made Italy now we must make Italians."
Greece - the myth existed and was leveraged by the state to form a nation-state.
France - the nation formed the state.
I don't think there is set sequence of events that needs to be followed. However, I do think there is a lack of precedent for outsiders forming a nation. I also find it a bit fanciful to think that outsiders can create a state which will have sufficient legitimacy to "create Italians." Iraq seems within the realm of possibility because there was significant nationalism in Iraq that desired a viable state to provide governance. We helped create it and now we are slowly leaving. The Kurds seem to be a bit out of place, but given the peculiarities of their situation, remaining a part of Iraq makes sense for them.
Lacking the preconditions that we enjoyed in Iraq, we end up in a situation like, say, Afghanistan, where there does not appear to be a strong sense of nationalism and no desire for governance above the community or provincial level. This, to me, suggests that regardless of whether we are state-building, nation-building, or nation-state-building, the result will be the same: FAIL.
The people of a nation generally share a common national identity, and part of nation-building is the building of that common identity. How we expect to nation build among Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, etc. who as pointed out, have seen their local governance work quite well for more than just a few years, is quite mind numbing.
"Not sure why you condition your question on "over the past 50 years." The last 50 years has been a transition between Western and Soviet domination and the redrawing of borders"
Basically, I used 50 years as my benchmark because I figure that was the start of decolonization, and weak states which probably lack either a sense of nationalism or fail to qualify as strong states. I'm thinking of my understanding of Africa; weak states occurred because they consisted of different tribes amalgamated together with little if any sense of unity. There the state preceded the nation, and the state rarely, if ever, became strong. Hence the succesion of coups d'etat. As an aside, your point about the Soviet-US confrontation is a good one; we perhaps didn't see the phenomenon of failed states that we now observe because, in a zero-sum conflict, each side had an interest in propping up an ostensibly strong state. To put it differently, perhaps I'm wrong - perhaps (I imagine more strongly than perhaps) Africa was not what it is today.
For a successful amalgamation of, if not tribal animosities, then a diverse archipelago, Indonesia is possibly a good example. A language - surely a part of a culture? - was formed (Bahasa Indonesia); radio stations that did not conform to language standards were banned; standardized spelling was introduced.
I again think socioeconomic development plays a role in nationalism and the culture of a nation. Radios and television and literacy - and literature - contribute to the formation of a common identity - particularly if a dictator chooses to reinforce the formation of said identity. I do think that - the difference in standard of living/socioeconomic development/per capita GDP might be the difference between Iraq and Afghanistan, or at least one difference.
I'm not sure whether outsiders can create a nation. I imagine the key variables are the duration that the outsiders try, and the ways in which they try. Perhaps British attempts to subjugate (so to speak) what became the United States was (from the British perspective) counterproductive; it only created more of a distinctly American identity. Conversely, perhaps there have been cases where nations have peaceably, and without such a convoluted causal chain as the example I just gave, created a nation; I'm just hard-pressed to think of one.
As an aside, did the nation create the state in France, or did classes (peasantry, the Third Estate - if I recall history classes correctly) create the state? What is the role of class - once more, perhaps an aspect of a nation-state's culture - in state-building/nation-building? Are there classes in Afghanistan?
ADTS
Take this article for what it's worth, but...
://www.newsweek.com/id/234281
"The fiercely nationalistic Iraqi public"
"How we expect to nation build among Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, etc..."
I think that's the problem. It can be done, but we can't do it. They have to. But do they want to?
I can't speak for Anna, but I think her reasoning was similar to Schmedlap's 1:54pm post and the over-generalization of words- culture, terrorism, etc. One concept that I'm currently sorting through is the distinction between the anthropologist and the counter-insurgent. Anthropologist have a strict "do no harm" mentality where they seek to observe a group of people without influecing that ecosystem. Contrastingly, when we go into an area, we want to have enough understanding of the people so that we can force change in them. It can be a change of behavior (i.e. it's not okay to cut your neighbor's heads off and fly planes into buildings) or a change of governance and economics (i.e. democracy and capitalism work for us so you need some of it to so that we can modernize you). To that end, Schmedlap's norms, values, and beliefs work.
I agree. If I was king for a day, the foreign policy would be that we can only help those that first help themselves. It's very similar to someone with a substance abuse issue. If you look at places where we've had moderate success with FID, SFA, COIN, occupation, and other interventions, places like the Phillipines, El Salvador, Colombia, South Korea, certain attributes come into play. 1. The host nation asked for our help. 2. American physical military presence was very small. 3. Amderican Advisors were limited into what missions they could do. 4. Many times, the State Department was in charge.
I'll throw one more out there for y'alls consideration. One thing that I would like to see more of is working groups. I did a couple in Monterey, the Salinas gang project is one of the unclassified ones, but they worked well. In a perfect world, I'd have a small team consisting of an anthropologist, sociologist, psychologist, economist, geologist, and systems engineer together to tackle a problem. Each specialist has a unique methodology on how to view the problem, but when you merge the various ideas together, sometimes you find better solutions. At a minimum, you get a much better understanding of the environment and issues.
I will end my nickel’s worth of commentary, by saying in my estimation, three primary factors stand out to me in nation building: the first two obviously are the level of economic development present, and the social homogeneity involved. However, the third and probably most important factor may very well be the level of commitment measured in footprint, both civilian and military, money, and time....always time, which may not be our most controllable.
Mike F:
It seems you are arguably committing a logical fallacy. For the sake of using social science terminology where it is not needed, for the simple reason that unnecessary jargon is always a good thing, let me express what I possibly see as follows. Certain factors (call them independent variables) were present; a result (call it a dependent variable) obtained. Therefore, the values on the independent variables seem to cause the value on the dependent variable. However, the proper way to assess the validity of the proposition would be as follows. Ideally, take a sample of all cases in which the values on the independent variables were present, and then see whether the same value on the dependent variable obtains. There might well be cases in which all the same values on the independent variables were present, but a different value on the dependent variable is observed. Also, it would be interesting to see if there are combinations of values on the independent variables, or omitted variables (eg, introduction of State Department control*), that possibly influenced the value on the dependent variable.
ADTS
* I'm thinking, at least in an anecdotal way, of the turf wars detailed in Mark Bowden's "Killing Pablo." It was the American Ambassador who wanted to circumvent civilian control over the military with respect to relevant operations; it was the CJCS Director of Operations who wanted to ensure civilian primacy over the military with respect to relevant operations. I don't have the book on me, and think part of this related to how much to "unleash" special operations forces (the Ambassador wanted to unleash them; the J-3 wanted to ensure they remained "leashed"), which I suppose is an interesting addendum to civilian primacy over the military and not necessarily a textbook case; but I digress.
Mike F.
I should have specified - but thought Schmedlap's blog (designed "by the world's greatest guy!") did so - to which blog post I was referring. It was Number 18.
Apologies, thanks, and respectfully,
ADTS
23. ADTS says, in response to
ADTS:
Schmedlap:
And, in the age of proper Netiquette being necessary, I should have specified that my noting your being "the world's greatest guy" was meant, of course, jokingly, not meanly.
Once more, apologies, thanks and respectfully,
ADTS
24. MikeF says, in response to
ADTS:
Hi ADTS. Yes, I understand independent/dependent variables, but I fail to see how turf wars during planning make it a "logical fallacy." The Phillipines, El Sal, and Colombia are generally considered successful FID missions based on the factors that I noted. Those were not my original ideas. Moreover, most of the constraints and restrictions were placed by the Host Nation or our Congress not the country team. Instead, I would submit that "(1) SF is inclined toward DA missions, (2) SF is not scalable for a task of this size (ref A'stan)" are flawed assumptions that show a limited understanding of special forces based on one or two group's mentalities.
Mike F:
"Instead, I would submit that "(1) SF is inclined toward DA missions, (2) SF is not scalable for a task of this size (ref A'stan)" are flawed assumptions that show a limited understanding of special forces based on one or two group's mentalities."
That very well may be true. Like I wrote, I have neither been there nor done that; you have. My understanding might very well be limited. You've served, I haven't; you know people in SF, I don't. I concede all of the above. Similarly, I apologize if I patronized you regarding independent versus dependent variables; the way I constructed sentence 3, I was more trying trying to be funny, although I do think IVs and DVs are probably the easiest way to examine the issue.
But to return to the logical fallacy, one could have all the independent variables have the same values, and then find cases with different values on the dependent variables. For example, there might be a country in which "1. The host nation asked for our help. 2. American physical military presence was very small. 3. Amderican Advisors were limited into what missions they could do. 4. Many times, the State Department was in charge." and the mission *still* failed. What you're doing is selecting on the the dependent variable. What one needs to do is find all cases in which values on the independent variable were present, and then see to what extent the same value on the dependent variable occurs. I suppose this is all just a fancy way of saying, "Post hoc, ergo propter hoc." Could one find a case in which all the values on your independent variables were present, and the value on your dependent variable was *different?*
The turf war story from "Killing Pablo" was meant, as suggested, merely as an anecdote, something in my head as I was composing this - an example of SFA/FID in which the relationship between the military and State was (arguably) convoluted and (probably more accurately) complex.
ADTS
26. MikeF says, in response to
ADTS:
No worries, ADTS. It is hard to convey one's thoughts through this medium, and it is even harder to joke at times :). I appreciate the clarification. As to your point, one could argue that intervention in Guatemala was a failed one. My personal opinion is that we should intervene as little and as discretely as possible. As for special forces, do some of them have too much of a focus on DA? Hell yes, and that is a on-going, contentious debate within their world. It will probably not surface to the public too often. So, what did I mean? Well for starters, I probably would have placed a former First Group guy that had spent significant time in SW Asia in charge of the new A'stan effort instead of the former commander of JSOC.
Mike F:
As they say, glad that it's all good. :) You're right: this is a hard medium through which to communicate, and an even harder one in which to joke.
Thanks in re: Guatemala. I'd simply question whether it's feasible to intervene as little and as discretely as possible when dealing with a failed state such as Afghanistan. I wonder if there's some form of momentum at play - once one intervenes with some tipping point of footprint, one's obligated to increase the size of that footprint to support the forces already present.* In other terminology, outcomes are "path dependent." Choices made early on determine the options one possesses later on - an obvious point in some respects, but one with great explanatory power in other respects.
Also, I don't know if I'm going off-topic (or more off-topic than usual), but as an aside about failed states versus non-failed states needing assistance (or not), take the Haiti/Chile earthquake example - no need for the US to take action (intervene?) in the latter case, because there is a functioning government there, compared to the former case (and, of course, because a functioning government can promulgate and enforce building codes, damage was less severe). When does intervention become assistance (or vice versa)? When does assistance become nation-/state-building? For how long has the Philippines needed US assistance and been fighting a Communist insurrection? For how long has Colombia been, or had been, a very dangerous place to be? Is military intervention the same as civil intervention, particularly if the military engages primarily if not exclusively on non-kinetic activities? Is American aid welcomed or resented (or both) (as neocolonialism?)? I think the last six sentences probably do a pretty decent job of encapsulating the debate Schmedlap intended us to have.
ADTS
The anecdotes in my mind are the books written and arguments made that if we had only had Rangers or conventional forces in 2001, we could have captured or killed bin Laden. Similarly, I read "Not a Good Day to Die," and the controversy surrounding that battle, and that's where I thought about once one has a footprint of a certain size (two battalions of light infantry, one needs to increase that footprint (eg, there should have been field artillery).
28. MikeF says, in response to
ADTS:
Well, you got all the questions down. Now, we just have to answer them :).
Mike F:
Yeah, me! :)
Any suggestions on how to go about doing so? :)
ADTS
30. MikeF says, in response to
ADTS:
I'll give it a go with the disclaimer that this is outside my expertise, but I have studied it a lot and hopefully my experience lends some understanding that one cannot learn elsewhere. I don't have any answers right now, but I think we should start by taking a step back and seeing the world as it is not how we wish it to be. Specifically, the 20th century goal of dividing the world into nation-states has not worked. Could it work many years from now? Maybe. Let's take the notion of A'stan being a failed state. This label implies that it was once a functioning state. I disagree with that. Even though it had a period of stability during the 60's and 70's (I think), that is very insufficient evidence to proclaim it was once a functioning state. Instead, it's a state that never was. Seoond, I dislike the "Global War on Terror" and what I'm starting to call Post-Modern Colonialism (i.e. Population Centric Counter-Insurgency). I don't see al Qaeda as an existential threat to the US. I'd prefer a strategy of deterrence or containment. Finally, the expansion of government (DHS) and the increased security measures we've enacted since 9/11 worry me. I think the term terrorism creates and exasperates some of the fear-mongering that we've had, and I don't like it. It seems to go against the principles of the Founding Fathers. So, there's some provacative thoughts.
Mike F:
First, I'll make similar disclaimers.
Moving on, I'd note the nation-state is a relatively recent invention. And the extension of statehood to large parts of the globe is even more recent (why I picked 1960 earlier in this thread as a benchmark for decolonization). I think statehood works fine for some states. Take Greece. Right now, skimming the headlines, it has a debt crisis. Do I predict an insurgency in Greece requiring outside intervention? Of course not. So the question becomes: why does statehood work for some states and not others? My answer, some of which is borrowed from others on this thread (e.g., General Observer, the distinction between nation and state) once more, is decolonization, the failure to combine nations with states when decolonizing (General Observer, Migdal), and other factors as well. For example, many former colonies are resource-rich - hence why they were colonized - and for some reason, being resource rich seems to make country both less wealthy and more politically unstable (the "resource curse" - Googleable). I could go on - there are a lot of reasons why weak states exist, and some are undoubtedly particular to each weak state there is, but the list would be exhaustive and probably unhelpful.
The bigger question is whether the nation-state will continue. My answer is, who knows? Would one living in a monarchy in 1750 have predicted a polity with a president in less than 50 years? I was reading in Slate that the Army used link diagrams to capture Saddam prior to the invention, let alone spread, of Facebook. Who would have predicted Facebook? I'm relatively immune, I think, to the globalization hype. First, I don't think that Amazon's ability to ship around the globe means the nation-state is dead - I'm skeptical business will trump politics. More, though, I'm not sure what will (would?) replace the nation-state. City-states, e.g., NYC-stan? Regions, e.g., Cascadia? (I've read Kaplan's "An Empire Wilderness" and heard of Garreau's "The Nine Nations of North America" - and thought another book of his I read was absolutely superb - Kaplan talks more than a bit, IIRC, about the US - and Canada and Mexico - breaking up into regions). But perhaps I simply lack imagination.
Second, I don't see AQ as an existential threat to the US, either. It's sacrilegious to say so, and I don't want to be blase about attacks that kill 3,000 people, but I suspect AQ has limited capabilities to conduct 9/11s, and to be far more sacrilegious, about the same number of people are killed driving each year than were killed on 9/11. (I haven't read it, but the book by John Mueller, "Overblown," is probably appropriate, and if you can't get that, he wrote a shorter version, I'm pretty sure, in Foreign Affairs. My understanding is Ian Lustick has a book out that essentially promotes deterrence against terrorism. But I digress...) 9/11's value lies in your third point, which I'll get to in a moment - its ability to terrorize us. One cannot have a war on terror because terror is a tactic, just as one cannot have a war on amphibious assaults because amphibious assaults are a tactic (or an operation or strategy :) ). One can, of course, have a war on AQ on the Japanese, but obviously you get what I'm saying. So I'm with you on GWOT. I'm more on the fence regarding PCCI, and I'm interested in why you are. My reservation is simply, "Does it work?", and if so, "Over a time range that a democracy can sustain?" and "With troop levels that democracies are willing to provide?" Regarding question number 1, I "discussed" briefly in an exchange with Colonel Gentile on Abu M's discussion board - before he sort of closed shop - about Stathis Kalyvas's work. I had the pleasure of meeting Stathis Kalyvas, and hearing him talk, and someone asked him (2007?), "What advice would you give General Petraeus?" to which Kalyvas responded, "I don't answer those sorts of questions, because my response would be, 'Instill fear.'" I'm also taken by my admittedly somewhat cursory reading of Gil Merom's "How Democracies Lose Small Wars," which argues, at least to some degree, that democracies lose small wars because they lack the stomach for brutality. So I wonder if the alternative to PCCI is brutality? Obviously that is antithetical to what the founders had in mind, and also, perhaps one should disaggregate the COIN element of GWOT from the global (i.e., not just AfPak) CT element of GWOT? When you talk about PMC (not Blackwater/Xe!), are you referring more toward SFA/FID such as in the Philippines, instead of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? I think of those as "in-between" cases - not Iraq or Afghanistan, not directly AQ-related, arguably more against people who possibly have legitimate grievances (accidental guerrillas?) - that probably best fit your idea - but I could well (obviously) be wrong.
Third, my only exposure to DHS is the same as most Americans, other than slightly knowing someone works there. It is a joke; I've flown El Al, and also another carrier out of Ben Gurion. But I imagine your point is directed more out of libertarian fears. I concede that terrorism scares people, and it's the word that scares people, and I think other factors scare people as well when one thinks of attacks that arguably could all be considered acts of terror (magnitude of attacks; visuals of attacks; timing and sophistication of attacks (e.g., consecutive versus concurrent)); kids versus adults. Still, a word is sometimes needed to describe a phenomenon, and if terror is that word, then so be it. Words are hard to change, and no one really controls them (nor would we want a state or entity that could or would). I haven't read enough about the Founding Fathers, but quite frankly, they seem like an odd amalgamation of characters who I, at least, would have to study more (e.g., Jefferson's "We need a revolution at least one generation" - sic?). But their principles I learned at least to some degree while reciting the Pledge in Mrs. Baldwin's class, and beyond, so I will once more do my best to respond. I think you're probably right - the Founders were for minimal government, and against government control of the populace. My own view is that oftentimes this is anachronistic, but more generally, I'm actually a Burkean conservative. I don't know how much I trust other people, and I like other people there to protect me, and while I don't support waterboarding or torture, I'm not sure how much I object to the government protecting me ("You want me on that wall! You need me on that wall!"). People don't seem to require much to turn on each other; we don't understand the origins of political or social stability; social order can evaporate pretty quickly (think Katrina). This makes me conflicted on the Second Amendment (anachronistic today or not?), although that's arguably a side issue. Bottom-line of this meandering paragraph: the GWOT might go against the principles of the Founding Fathers, although I'm not sure; the GWOT might go against the principles of the Founding Fathers, although I'm not sure I care; the Founding Fathers aren't alive today, so who knows how they would respond to the GWOT. Finally, isn't it a mistake to aggregate the Founders, just as - jump in Schmedlap - it's a mistake to aggregate an appellate court (or SCOTUS) decision when the former is 2-1 or the latter is 5-4? The Founders were a large group of people, some of whom had conflicting ideas, among whom compromise had to be forged, and who could be expected to hold different ideas were they to see today's realities.
Provocative thoughts on your end, indeed. Perhaps on my end, too.
Thanks for the dialogue.
ADTS
32. Mike says, in response to
ADTS:
Thanks for the discussion. I'll give a short reply for today followed with a proper response on Monday. My brain is fried from TBI therapy today (the physical therapist is brutal- it's like resetting the hard drive on your computer when it freezes). So, last year, I wanted to find a comparativeable time in US history to what we're facing today. I chose the Transcendentalist and started reading heavily on Emerson and Whitman. They faced slavary, civil war, transition from agragrian to industrial age, anarchists, and the search for a theory on how God created the world (i.e. evolution). The period just worked for me. I like the way they discussed the issues to frame problems of the day and work towards creative solutions, and I wrote a short piece for SWJ called "Nature Redux" by Major Michael Few. Take a look at it and let me know what you think. I'm not anti-PCCI necessarily, but I do think we need to relook the issue. I think the terminology is confusing and limiting for military personnel that don't study it everyday, and I think as a strategy, we don't do it well and it cost too much. DHS is just a joke and a waste of the taxpayer's money.
I don't disagree with everything in the last two comments, but I would just throw in one idea. Measuring the threat of AQ in terms of number of people killed as a direct result of a terrorist attack is crude, to put it mildly. The economic impacts have equally human consequences and the attacks are often intended both to lend credibility to the terrorist's cause and to provoke reactions either at home (increasing expenditures for security and imposing regulations that increase the cost of doing business) or abroad (engaging in costly overseas adventures and creating so-called accidental guerrillas). Again, I'm not disagreeing, but just quibbling over the measure of what is a threat and how to measure (I definitely agree that AQ is not an existential threat or anything even closely approaching it).
34. ADTS says, in response to
Mike:
Mike F:
I'll take a look at the piece, and get back to you. Your look at the transcendentalists looks both creative (not to be patronizing :))and promising.
As always, thanks.
ADTS
"Measuring the threat of AQ in terms of number of people killed as a direct result of a terrorist attack is crude, to put it mildly."
You are, of course, right. I would, though, be interested in reading Mueller's book "Overblown" and seeing his argument in more detail (although I have a stack of books on my shelf awaiting me from my most recent, overextended Amazon purchase).
Respectfully, ADTS
Of course Schmedlap is right. I did not mean to diminish or minimize the economic and psychological impact of 9/11. Some of what I wrote is how I feel, some is how I think. I'd like to revamp the narrative on how we should react or act in the future. A change in philosophy if you will. Here's one analogy. Let's look at this from the perspective of high school. The US is the top of the class, straight A student. We're also the QB of the football team and the captain of the basketball team. Most likely to succeed type of guy. On the other hand, al Qaeda is at the bottom of the class headed no where fast. Out of envy or jealousy, he wants to start a fight with us and bring us down to his level. He spreads rumors throughout school, gains crowds, and attempts to provoke us into a fight on school grounds by hitting us in the cafeteria. How should we react? If we fight him in school, then he wins regardless of the outcome of the fight. We both get suspended, and our reputation is tarnished. In public, the best course of action is to turn the other cheek and walk away. To end this problem, we can confront him in private- outside of school with no crowds. We can beat him to a pulp, and he'll go away. Settling this manner in private, we maintain our reputation and drive on being successful with college scholarships, internships, and future prospects. Al Qaeda will probably drop out of school and die of a drug overdose one day or just be a welfare recipient. Regardless, he's not our problem. We don't need to try and fix him.
Mike F:
What you're reminding me of is Martin van Creveld's argument that powerful states cannot win against insurgents. If the more powerful side prevails, then it merely affirmed expectations. If the less powerful side loses, well, then, it lost to the ostensibly weaker state.
I wonder how well your high school analogy fits what van Creveld writes. Obviously, fighting in school and fighting in public mirror van Creveld's argument. The issue of audiences matter, somehow. And while I realize you're providing a thought experiment, how, in real life, though, would one confront an insurgent "with no crowds...beat him to a pulp [so] he'll go away" such that we "maintain our reputation and drive on being successful?"
Similarly, does the prior course of action *make* the high school insurgent/Al Queda not our problem? What about "beat[ing] him to a pulp" makes him go away? The question I really am getting at is, first, whether and how we have an ability to influence an insurgent (and here I'm using insurgent and terrorist interchangeably, which might be a logical rather than merely a linguistic mistake to do, but so be it), simply by (once more) "beat[ing] him to a pulp," or does the insurgent have a level of resourcefulness such that he can "take the pain," get up, move on, and continue what he was doing? In other words, is the relevant question the balance of power or the balance of will? What if it matters more to the insurgent to achieve his goal than getting beat up, whereas *administering* the beatings is a costly, painful and timely endeavor, and so administering the beatings becomes more of a burden than receiving them? Wouldn't that leave the insurgent undeterred? I guess the question, once more, is whether one is trying to break the opponent's will, or his capabilities. I'm reminded of the adage that the guerilla wins by not losing. Keep getting in enough fights, even if you lose, and eventually you'll prevail. (Think of the fight scene in "Cool Hand Luke" - Paul Newman won even though George Kennedy "beat him" because he earned everyone's respect through his ability to absorb punishment.)
Reputation fits somewhere in the mix, too; I just haven't figured out where in the equation, other than the oblique references to it in the van Creveld reference above. :)
And I don't know that we need to try and fix al Queda, but I imagine that if nothing else, electoral demands will ensure administrations will try to do so. Similarly, there's a distinction between deterrence, denial and (I forget :), but something offensive) when dealing with terrorism (Martha Crenshaw). Would it be wise to simply focus on deterrence and denial? I'm not saying you're wrong - I'm really merely asking out of curiosity over your opinion.
38. MikeF says, in response to
ADTS:
I read the Transformation of War two years ago. I guess that I was influenced by Van Creveld's argument. I developed that analogy this weekend so I thought I'd test it out on y'all. It is by no means definitive. This course would be to take the higher ground. "Beating him up" would be allowing our CT units to track them down outside the limelight. Instead of engaging directly, we just ignore AQ and other global losers and concentrate on preparing our country for further success in the 21st century. The main counter-argument to this proposal would be Columbine. What happens when the loser goes postal?
Mike F
In re: Nature Reduxx
First, since I haven’t before, please let me sincerely thank you for your service. Second, please let me state that I hope you receive the care you require for your TBI, and that you overcome what ails you. Third, I feel bad. You’ve been a good “conversation partner” on this board, and I’ve enjoyed it. That said, I don’t feel I possess the knowledge base in philosophy, literature, theology, the historical context of the Transcendentalists, and the humanities in general to comment intelligently on your piece. (I haven’t taken “English” properly defined since high school.) I’ve thought about “constructive criticism,” and I’ve come up with a few piddling observations – “define wicked problem more carefully; does capitalism really destroy the social fabric?” – but none do justice to your work. I I like it. It reads well and honestly seems to deal with truths and problems with which we all – or the sentient among us – grapple. It is poetic and muses on a variety of subjects. It contemplates the age in which we live and struggles to ask whether it is unique or universal. I particularly liked your paragraph whose first sentence ends with anomie, and I particularly liked your closing paragraph. I feel like this is like the fictional books I read, and I mean that in a good way – I tend to put them next to my bed, read and reread them, and then memorize quotes from them which I then recall (or utilize?) when they seem appropriate. This is a piece deserving of continued reflection on my part.
Respectfully,
ADTS
Mike F:
"I read the Transformation of War two years ago. I guess that I was influenced by Van Creveld's argument. I developed that analogy this weekend so I thought I'd test it out on y'all. It is by no means definitive. This course would be to take the higher ground. "Beating him up" would be allowing our CT units to track them down outside the limelight. Instead of engaging directly, we just ignore AQ and other global losers and concentrate on preparing our country for further success in the 21st century. The main counter-argument to this proposal would be Columbine. What happens when the loser goes postal?"
I think the high school analogy is a good one; perhaps let's run with it some more. First, in an age where Dubai seems to have reconstructed the Mossad assassination with considerable skill, how feasible is "allowing our CT units to track them down outside the limelight?" I realize not every terrorist resides in a luxury hotel in Dubai - some live in places far removed - but even then, investigative journalists are savvy, and bureaucrats (and others?) are prone to leak when it suits them.
Your next sentence seems to imply the way to beat the loser is to get into the good colleges, get the good internships, get the good jobs, etc. I'm not sure how to think about this. It sort of gets into your third sentence, i.e., what happens if/when he gets postal. It depends a lot on the high school and community, I think. Not everyone's definition or attainment of success (obviously :)) entails going to college, obtaining good internships, and getting (say) a job on Wall Street. Let's say instead of going off to college, you do perfectly fine staying in town. Except, the loser is still there. He remains your arch-nemesis. You beat him up now - you're going to jail. Meanwhile, he can harass you, but you don't have enough evidence for the police to take to the prosecutor. Relatedly, the more success you achieve, the more he loathes you. You can't win. You try to succeed, you only antagonize him more; you don't try to succeed, you hurt yourself. You could try and beat him up out of the limelight, but that might entail getting caught, because it's hard to do, and you might have to work with some pretty unsavory characters. So one day he could go postal if you've been successful, I guess, and there'd have been nothing we could do, or that we hadn't already done.
I'm very partial to your idea of "making America strong again" (which I interpret as neoisolationism and/or offshore balancing). But the analogy above makes me think more (which means it's a good one :)). How can we remain engaged in the world without antagonizing AQ or those who do or would support it, or its counterparts (let's just say AQ), or our allied nations? Not to remain engage in the world, at least economically, would mean we are taking the route of not attempting to achieve success. But we have to worry about AQ going postal still. I guess the simple answer is essentially what you recommend: ignore them. Continue to grow, and by doing so (and hopefully I'm not being too sappy here) grow strong - the more Googles we build, the harder we are to destroy; the more Saturday Night Lives, the harder we are to destroy. Essentially, don't let the fear of AQ going postal *terrorize* us. Take sensible precautions, but don't change our way of life.
I'd point out the flaws in my argument are that, first, as I noted, countries with which we are allied have different problems or are in a different environment than we are with different options (Tom Friedman's "The World Is Flat" might be a good illustration that there's no getting away from globalization, even if, as I wrote before, I'm skeptical of globalization's hype.) Second, is it simplistic to say, "Continue to grow...but defend yourself against the loser?" Where is the proper balance between continuing your way of life and defending yourself against the next suicide attack? I think that arguably is something that will continually have to reassess and rethink. Certainly the arguments over, say, TSA's efficacy and airport screening are examples is such debate. Third, am I wrong (and tell me if I am:)) that CT units can*not* solve the terrorist problem? Here I'm thinking of the line that might be blurry between insurgents and terrorists. Obviously once a group reaches Hezbollah-sized proportions, it becomes easy to identify and target. But first, does that solve anything? The Israelis have been fighting for 60 years, and while they've probably prevailed, I wonder if there's a dearth of recruits for Hezbollah. Perhaps more (or less) salient is, what about the losers who aren't even in class with us, who never brush by us in the halls, until the day they do something really nasty to us in the parking lot or walking home after dismissal. How adequate are our intelligence services at targeting unknown as opposed to known threats? How long has it taken them - did it take them? - to reorient themselves from state-centric thinking to terrorism and transnational issues? Was and has that time, and effort, been adequate and sufficient?
A useful analogy.
ADTS
Thanks for the praise and the read. I wrote that a year ago in a creative spurt. I'm glad to find some of it still holds true. Wicked problems are ones that are so ill-structured or unstructured that they cannot be solved. Terrorism, the drug war, gangs, education, and water rights are examples. It's a realitively new field in social sciences. I think it will take off like systems engineering did in the 1990's. I find it fascinating, and I like the challenge of trying to problem solve such issues. For example, I do favor capitalism. But little regulation leaves us with bad meat and the economic crisis. On the other hand, too much regulation limits trade and brings in the thought police. It's all about finding a proper balance. As for the TBI, I'm getting good treatment; however, I may have to retire from the military. We'll see. If so, then I'm probably going to expand my research in wicked problem past small wars to help solve social issues for the state of NC. Additionally, I eventually want to translate some of this small wars stuff and foreign policy into mathematics. My dissertation is tentatively titled "Small Wars and the Theory of Games."
42. MikeF says, in response to
ADTS:
Well, we've gone all across the board with this thread. I'll bring up one scenario that does bother me. If our time period is similar to the Transcendentalist, then we have to be concerned about another World War happening in our lifetime. Sounds crazy huh? It seemed crazy to everyone in 1890 as well. That was a period of tremendous change similar to what we're seeing now. So, where would it start? Europe. The formation of the EU was supposed to bring a lasting peace, but what happens if states begin to fall economically and the system collapses? That could trigger war. Just something to consider.
"Thanks for the praise and the read. I wrote that a year ago in a creative spurt. I'm glad to find some of it still holds true. Wicked problems are ones that are so ill-structured or unstructured that they cannot be solved. Terrorism, the drug war, gangs, education, and water rights are examples. It's a realitively new field in social sciences. I think it will take off like systems engineering did in the 1990's. I find it fascinating, and I like the challenge of trying to problem solve such issues. For example, I do favor capitalism. But little regulation leaves us with bad meat and the economic crisis. On the other hand, too much regulation limits trade and brings in the thought police. It's all about finding a proper balance. As for the TBI, I'm getting good treatment; however, I may have to retire from the military. We'll see. If so, then I'm probably going to expand my research in wicked problem past small wars to help solve social issues for the state of NC. Additionally, I eventually want to translate some of this small wars stuff and foreign policy into mathematics. My dissertation is tentatively titled "Small Wars and the Theory of Games.""
###
First, glad to have read it. Second, I don't want to get into a debate about capitalism's goods and ills (you're welcome, Schmedlap :)), because that would take weeks if not days if not hours to resolve (months?). :) And I think Schmedlap's guidance with respect to our (mine and his) Alexander Haig discussion is probably apropos: we shouldn't let it turn into a blog of its own. Good luck with the projects in mind, both military- and non-military related. I hope you're able to pursue the course that you desire, whether to remain in the military (which I assume you do, although I could be wrong) or to work for the private or public sectors (working for the state of NC sounds like it could be fascinating). Either way, it sounds like you have solid plans and options in place. Congratulations on the dissertation, by the way.
Regards,
ADTS
Well, we've gone all across the board with this thread. I'll bring up one scenario that does bother me. If our time period is similar to the Transcendentalist, then we have to be concerned about another World War happening in our lifetime. Sounds crazy huh? It seemed crazy to everyone in 1890 as well. That was a period of tremendous change similar to what we're seeing now. So, where would it start? Europe. The formation of the EU was supposed to bring a lasting peace, but what happens if states begin to fall economically and the system collapses? That could trigger war. Just something to consider.
I concur. I actually place little stock in the EU. Unifying the United States was difficult enough. Unifying the EU into an actual union seems more difficult - too many states, too many languages, too many cultures (to get back to the original idea of this thread :), not enough aligning of state and nation). And macroeconomic policy may be too difficult to coordinate between some states with differing macroeconomic situations. I see the EU probably falling apart, and almost certainly the EMU doing so. Nor do I think economic relations ultimately trump political and military relations. The fundamental changes I see (or have read about) are (possibly, because it's highly counterintuitive to at least a degree)the spread of nuclear weapons as a good thing, in that if destruction is mutually assured, then neither side will choose to initiate conflict. Think the Cold War. There's also something called the stability-instability paradox, which is also appropriate to the Cold War: stability among the Great Powers (eg, the Soviet Union and the US), but instability among the "lower powers," in part because of attempts to "win" in a zero-sum game by fighting proxy wars. But those weren't world wars. To get back to the time of the Transcendentalists, there's a great essay by Carl Kaysen in International Security that argues war is no longer really desirable, because what we fought for in the past (land, useful agriculture, the primary mode of production as Marx :) would say) no longer is useful. However, Peter Liberman wrote a book called "Does Conquest Pay?" in which his assessment is that in World War II, the countries Germany conquered *did* pay off as profitable for Germany. I don't know if that's appropriate for post-industrial societies though; he's really talking about commodity transfers. I'd recommend, first, that you check out this link - ://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norman_Angell#The_Great_Illusion - in which someone predicted *four* years before World War I that war was obsolete, and *this* book - ://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&tid=6821 - in which people tried to grapple with how to think about Great Power Politics (deliberately capitalized after John Mearsheimer's book of the same name) after the fall of the Soviet Union. (Like I said, what I'm good at, if nothing else, is compiling reading lists. :) To get back to the question at hand, though, one could perhaps more easily see major great power conflicts - I don't as easily see a major, "all-out" World War. I'm thinking of Japan and China, Korea and China, Korea and Japan, France and Germany (redux), etc. I doubt the latter, because I think there the conditions for great power peace are too great - the cultures *are* too similar, although the Introduction to this thread might suggest otherwise, just as I wouldn't expect the US and the UK to go to war. I'm not Asia-centric though in terms of the potential for great power conflict - I could see Eastern Europe quite easily being such an arena. Why do you suppose Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland were so eager to get under the NATO security umbrella (now, forget about the EU - will NATO endure?) and why missile defense was such a big deal? But could there be another World War? Absolutely. I hate to be so blase, but what's the quote (at least at the end of "Black Hawk Down" (the movie, not the far, far, far, far superior book)) - "Only the dead have seen the last of war"?
Respectfully
ADTS
45. ADTS says, in response to
ADTS:
://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/12/AR2010031202997.html?hpid=opinionsbox1