Why not? Everyone else has an equally worthless opinion.
Why not? Here goes.
In discussions about Afghanistan, there is a lot of emphasis being placed on controlling human terrain, expanding ink spots, and other concepts. To me, these are just non-linear variations of maneuver warfare that are not appropriate. I guess you can kind of talk in terms of “human terrain” if your brain is only wired to think in terms of 1990s Army doctrine and/or analogies to it. To me, that’s like thinking of a laptop as an electronic typewriter. I mean, yeah, it is electronic and it has some superficial similarities to a typewriter. But it is not a typewriter. Likewise, “human terrain” seems to be a term that seeks to clarify a concept by grossly misrepresenting it. Okay, the population is human and in some abstract way I guess you can think of it in terms of some kind of cosmic terrain. We do not move on, or capture, “human terrain.” Just stop using the term. I have also heard the phrase, “seize control of the population.” I refuse to even discuss that one. Just stop.
The Taliban’s strength is the set of perceptions that it has created in the minds of the Afghans. Our objective is to alter those perceptions. We do that by conducting operations on physical terrain in order to create indicators that lead to desired perceptions, nullify indicators that lead to undesired perceptions, and limit the ability of the enemy to create indicators that reinforce undesired perceptions. What does this look like in practice? First, let’s look at the perceptions and then look at examples of how to alter them.
The Taliban has created perceptions among the Afghans that it can do the following…
1) If someone attempts to use force against the Taliban, then the Taliban will be able to identify the individual(s) and retaliate with overwhelming force and terror.
2) If someone attempts to share intelligence about the Taliban with Coalition forces, then the Taliban will be able to identify and punish the individual(s), either personally or by punishing their family members of community.
3) If locals succeed in allying with the Coalition and driving the Taliban out, the Taliban will be able to wait until the Coalition leaves and then take vengeance upon the locale.
4) In some cases, there may even be the perception that life under Taliban rules is not so undesirable.
So how do you alter these perceptions? Here are some examples, addressing specific perceptions, in the same order as above.
1) Publicize examples of Afghans fighting back against the Taliban and suffering no retaliation. Publicize examples of Afghans denouncing Taliban influence. Such messages contradict notions that the Taliban is a juggernaut that cannot be resisted.
2) When Taliban fighters are captured, killed, or their operations are thwarted by intelligence derived from locals, publicize this fact (but, of course, not the source). If an area is cleared of Taliban and occupied by Coalition forces, emphasize that it was done through intelligence provided by locals. Saturate the area with messages that local intelligence helped to purge the area of Taliban and is continuing to help deter any attempts by the Taliban to return.
3) Arm and train villages for self-defense. If possible, bring locals on raids against soft targets. This could reinforce the belief that they can fight back against Taliban and maybe even create the impression that there has been blood spilled which would preclude further reconciliation with Taliban elements, creating greater motivation for the people to resist a Taliban return.
As for the fourth one, you got me there. I guess you’ll have to throw down Ramadi style until they have a change of heart.
What does this look like at the country-wide operational level? In my ideal world, the country-level folks would simply be there to ensure the small units got what they needed. Other than that, they would be focused on governance, infrastructure, relations with other states, and setting conditions for economic development.
All of this moving around, setting up new COPs, dismantling old ones, and constantly shuffling the deck is just micromanagement from what I can tell. If you are a Brigade Commander, or higher, then you should be focused on the provincial leaders, large-scale infrastructure initiatives, and host nation politics. Based upon those considerations, you adjust constraints and occasionally issue specified tasks to subordinate units. Other than that, trust your subordinate leaders to handle their AO and focus on responding to their initiatives, rather than forcing your initiatives upon them. Yeah, I guess not micromanaging that runs counter to decades of indoctrination into the Army culture for many commanders, but it's worth a try because it generally works.
So there. I am no longer the only blogger who has not put forth his own bright idea. Feel free to rip it to shreds in the comment section. Whatever.