If you have not yet read Bernard Finel’s piece in Armed Forces Journal, then you should. It is refreshing to see a new idea, rather than a bunch of enthusiasts re-arguing their pet issues over and over. I am not a strategy guy and have no desire to be one, but I liked this proposal.
He starts off by committing what would be a social faux pas in many circles, pointing out the obvious truth that many dare not – or at least prefer not – to speak: that we suck at counterinsurgency operations. He then makes some observations that appear to be self-evident and obvious, yet not widely stated by most people. Whereas most of the focus on Iraq and Afghanistan has always been how to salvage the operation, he points out the ridiculously high costs and negligible gains beyond the initial invasions. He then proposes an alternative policy of military operations of limited duration and scope to eliminate a threat and, if necessary, followed by follow-on strikes if the threats re-emerge.
I have some questions and concerns, but I think he’s got a pretty sound concept.
Question 1: What precedent are we setting in the international community?
Even an operation as controversial as Operation Iraqi Freedom had the backing of dozens of countries and some UN Resolutions to back it up. How likely are we to get support for the quick strikes that, I am guessing, will be more frequent? How long will it take to get that support? Or will we not bother obtaining support due to the short duration, limited scope, and lack of occupation? That seems to resemble what Russia did in Georgia. Are we not helping to establish precedent in international law that this type of operation is okay? Won’t this increase the probability that Russia flexes its muscle in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia? Or increase the probability of other major powers misbehaving?
Question 2: How does this square with our efforts at public diplomacy?
We already get blamed for a lot of evils that are not really our fault. It seems easier to blame us for even more stuff and for those charges to be perceived as credible if we implement a policy of striking smaller threats in greater frequency (again, I am assuming that we will strike more often – perhaps Finel does not assume/agree that this will be the case or be necessary). Also, when we strike and then leave, that can be perceived as a callous disregard for the fallout of our actions – kind of the opposite of occupation. When we occupy, we get blamed for everything. If we just strike and leave, then we will likely be blamed for the chaos that gets left behind.
Question 3: Where do we get the intelligence?
It is tough to get decent intelligence unless you are actually on the ground prior to operations. Do we have that capability?
Those are what popped into my mind. But, based upon what he has written, I like the general concept and think it has potential to be a very good proposal. I have absolutely no idea how realistic it would be to implement, politically.
Zen Pundit also has some commentary on it and he raises some smarter concerns than I do. But, I think Finel’s proposal sustains Zen’s critiques pretty well. Zen writes that…
Under Finel’s prospective doctrine, the US military will be greenlighted to fight only the wars it likes best because some foes are more targetable than others…
I don’t know if that is accurate, but to be fair I will point out that Zen can bench more than I can and that counts for something at Schmedlap.com. He also goes on to state…
… where we have a real national interest in friendly states with legitimate governments beating back insurgents, COIN is a better choice.
I think Zen is doing what I took pains to avoid doing: choosing how to apply the concept rather than asking how Finel proposes the concept would be applied. I do not know how he proposes to apply it but I do see several possibilities and realize that others are also possible. Not knowing the full set of options or which he is advocating, I cannot conclude that COIN is better. For example, suppose we have a friendly government that is unable to mitigate a threat within their borders and we perceive danger to our interests. I could envision the Finel doctrine taking the form of a small US footprint of advisors or special operations forces or clandestine forces or something similar working with the local government to aid us in our targeting. Once coordinations are made and intelligence shared, we launch of quick strike operation and then quickly withdraw. I think that could be a far better alternative than COIN.
I will stop now as this is big picture stuff that I generally try to not wade to deeply into.