We apparently didn't do what we did and we need to re-try some old stuff and call it new
I do not know why I bother, but I will anyway. I just read today’s piece by Bruce Hoffman (
Al Qaeda has a new strategy. Obama needs one too. (h/t to
SWJ). I will just cut straight to the quotes…
"… two key dots have yet to be connected: Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the alleged Northwest Airlines Flight 253 attacker, and Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, the trusted CIA informant turned assassin… they both exemplify a new grand strategy that al-Qaeda has been successfully pursuing for at least a year."
That kind of reminds me of
a book that came out about ten or fifteen years ago. But that thought aside, the assertion intrigued me, so I read on to see how these two seemingly unrelated events exemplify a new grand strategy. There seems to be very little new here. The pocket-rocket bomber does not seem significantly different than the shoe-bomber. The CIA informant-bomber does not seem significantly different than the Mosul chow hall bomber. But Hoffman is kind of a big deal in DC, so I read on with an open mind.
"Throughout 2008 and 2009, U.S. officials repeatedly trumpeted al-Qaeda's demise. In a May 2008 interview with The Washington Post, then-CIA Director Michael Hayden heralded the group's 'near strategic defeat.'"
Wait a second. The term in quotes was indeed used by Hayden. But there is a lot of context missing. The author supplied a link, so I followed it. Let’s look at the context...
"On balance, we are doing pretty well," he said, ticking down a list of accomplishments: "Near strategic defeat of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Near strategic defeat for al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. Significant setbacks for al-Qaeda globally -- and here I'm going to use the word 'ideologically' -- as a lot of the Islamic world pushes back on their form of Islam," he said.
That is much different than what is suggested by the quote in isolation. In the author's defense, the link was provided so readers can assess context, but I doubt the hyperlink works in the print edition.
"… al-Qaeda late last month launched two separate attacks less than a week apart -- one failed and one successful -- triggering the most extensive review of U.S. national security policies since 2001."
Bigger than the 9/11 Commission review from late 2002 to mid-2004? Wow.
Now the setting has been established. Recent attacks that appear strikingly similar to past attacks apparently are not. Your intuition deceives you. Our apparent past assessments that al-Qaeda was “near strategic defeat” (presuming that claim was actually made) turned out to be wrong. On the contrary, al-Qaeda Strikes Back! To make matters even worse, we are not connecting the dots in recognizing al-Qaeda’s new strategy. Count me among the alarmed! I cannot help but read on to find out how this terrorist juggernaut is going to destroy my way of life unless we listen to the author's advice as we undergo this most extensive review of security policy (I need to implement a feature into the blog that cues dramatic music at points like this).
Hoffman outlines “five core elements to this strategy.” I will hit upon them in a different sequence: 3, 4, 2, 1, 5.
3. “… al-Qaeda is still trying to create divisions within the global alliance arrayed against it by targeting key coalition partners.”
That seems like a pretty reasonable and straightforward assessment that I suspect most agree with.
4. “… al-Qaeda is aggressively seeking out, destabilizing and exploiting failed states and other areas of lawlessness… The terrorist network sees failing states as providing opportunities to extend its reach, and it conducts local campaigns of subversion to hasten their decline. Over the past year, it has increased its activities in places such as Pakistan, Algeria, the Sahel, Somalia and, in particular, Yemen.”
I agree with that much. But, the part in the middle is a strange way to spin the situation. He wrote…
“… the United States remains preoccupied with trying to secure yesterday's failed state -- Afghanistan -- al-Qaeda is busy staking out new terrain.”
Yesterday’s failed state? I think this is a rhetorical device. And if I understand how it is being used, it is to suggest that we’re bogged down someplace where AQ is not located and ignoring “today’s failed states” such as Pakistan (which, presumably is separate from our operations in Afghanistan?). Or I guess we are ignoring Somalia and Yemen, even though we conduct operations in those areas? Is it just the size of the footprint that he is getting at? Would he prefer that we put a few Brigades in each locale? I am not sure what he is hinting at.
2. “… al-Qaeda has stepped up a strategy of economic warfare… Over the past year, the group has issued statements, videos, audio messages and letters online trumpeting its actions against Western financial systems, even taking credit for the economic crisis.”
That does not really sound like economic warfare to me. That sounds like a lot of AQ bluster that is divorced from reality. Oops, maybe I should have read on…
"However divorced from reality these claims may be, propaganda doesn't have to be true to be believed, and the assertions resonate with al-Qaeda's target audiences."
Now I am even more confused. They are making claims of economic warfare. Those claims are divorced from reality (but believed by a certain target audience). How is this a strategy of economic warfare? Am I one of those people who cannot connect dots or is there some other information that he assumes the average reader knows? Is the next paragraph the answer?
“Heightened security measures… coupled with the likely… passenger-screening and intelligence technologies, stand to cost a lot of money, while the war in Afghanistan constitutes a massive drain on American resources… al-Qaeda seems to think that a strategy of financial attrition will pay outsize dividends.”
So, all of the “divorced from reality” claims in the previous paragraph – are those some kind of instructions for decentralized cells to act upon? And even taking all of the costs mentioned, plus those not mentioned (slower flow of passengers and cargo through terminals mean less profit; higher shipping costs mean higher prices passed on to consumers), are we really in financial danger from throwing around a few hundred billion dollars per year on this stuff? We just passed twelve trillion
in debt for reasons almost entirely related to corruption, mania, and incompetence; no terrorist threats or global instability were required.
1. “… al-Qaeda… seeks to flood our already information-overloaded national intelligence systems with myriad threats and background noise. Al-Qaeda hopes we will be so distracted and consumed by all this data that we will overlook key clues…”
I am guessing that he has already published a large body of research backing this up because the assertion on its face is not very convincing. What my layman’s brain sees is a lot of attempts to thwart our sensors, not by flooding us with information that will cause us to overlook clues, but rather by erasing any clues or indicators from their operations that we are known to look for. That seems to pretty clearly be why they prefer educated, financially well-off individuals to perpetrate attacks in the U.K. or the U.S. In fact, he goes on to point this out in item number five…
5. “… al-Qaeda is covetously seeking recruits from non-Muslim countries who can be easily deployed for attacks in the West... especially converts to Islam whose appearances and names would not arouse the same scrutiny that persons from Islamic countries might… of countries that participate in the U.S. visa-waiver program… because they can move freely between Western countries and blend easily into these societies… [AQ] constantly monitors our defenses… to identify new gaps and opportunities that can be exploited…”
How does this square with item 1? I suppose both could be occurring, with one complementing the other, but this is not readily apparent. Indeed, far from flooding us with information (how would they do that?) they seem to be doing some fairly fundamental intelligence and counterintelligence work, adhering to sound OPSEC. Is that really a “core element” of a strategy? And then there is my favorite line…
“Its operatives track our congressional hearings, think-tank analyses and media reports, all of which provide strategic intelligence…” (emphasis mine)
LOL!
Okay, so all of this "strategic" analysis was done for a reason, and now we come to it. This is the end of the paper where all authors assert, basically, given the issues laid out in the preceding paragraphs, here is the problem and the solution. Without further delay…
Problem: "…we are stuck in a pattern of belated responses, rather than anticipating [AQ’s] moves and developing preemptive strategies. The ‘systemic failure’ of intelligence analysis and airport security that Obama recently described was… a failure to recognize al-Qaeda's new strategy."
Really? Let us suppose that we recognized AQ’s "new" strategy. Suppose that we understood that AQ is waging economic warfare, trying to increase ambiguity by blanketing us with information, trying to identify what indicators we look for and then erasing those from their operations, seeking to expand operations into failed or failing states, and trying to create divisions in the global alliance… how does this understanding lead to the information given to the CIA and passed along to DHS being acted upon? Was it bureaucratic inefficiency and negligence or was it a misunderstanding of our enemy’s strategy? I see zero evidence that it was the latter. I find it amazing that we apparently do not understand the strategy, but he apparently does. He throws out a fair amount of assertions that I suspect are widely held (3 and much of 4 and 5) – not just wisdom only possessed by the author. Others (1, 2, and the remainder of 4 and 5) are contradictory at worst and speculative at best. But, moving on to the solution…
Solution: "… a new approach to counterterrorism is essential… a new strategy to match al-Qaeda's… breaking the cycle of radicalization and recruitment that sustains the movement."
That is fairly reasonable. I am not so sure it is new, given our existing recognition that we need to do this, given the plaudits for similar efforts in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait, and the whole "population-centric" approaches that we have chosen in Iraq and Afghanistan, and praise heaped upon folks like Greg Mortensen, and similar statements made and initiatives attempted even by the likes of General Abizaid several years ago, and our attempts to quell outrage over propaganda windfalls such as Gitmo and Abu Ghraib, and about a dozen other examples.
"Remarkably, more than eight years after Sept. 11, we still don't fully understand our dynamic and evolutionary enemy. We claim success when it is regrouping and tally killed leaders while more devious plots are being hatched."
Who does this? Or is he just mischaracterizing the earlier quote, again, and ignoring the fundamental change in command climate in both Iraq and Afghanistan?
Much of his analysis is questionable, but he manages to end with a rallying cry for “a new approach,” so this will probably be held up as a “voice that needed to be heard” or “statement that needed to be made” or some similar nonsense.
Okay, I’m done now.