In the off chance that any readers of this blog do not also read the SWJ blog, I'm reposting a comment here that I made at SWJ (with some editing for clarity).
First off, the background. Below is a quote from the author of
a recent piece featured at SWJ. The thesis of the article pertains to the professional education of our leaders. The author wonders why we apparently are not producing any Kilcullens. My reaction is not to that assertion (which I also disagree with), but rather with the example that he uses to make his opening point, below. He touts the importance of people like Kilcullen because Kilcullen was an influence on our COIN doctrine and now, allegedly, either that COIN doctrine or (even more unlikely, imo) Kilcullen's work, in general, is the cornerstone of our current company-level operations. I am not buying it.
"The greatest single influence on our counterinsurgency doctrine isn’t a Marine. He isn’t even an American, or a colonel or a general or an admiral for that matter. He is an Australian lieutenant colonel who did the bulk of his influential work as a captain—work that has become the cornerstone of company-level counterinsurgent operations..."
Neither our COIN doctrine nor Kilcullen's work has been the - or one of the few - greatest influence(s) on our COIN operations and it is not the cornerstone of company-level operations. Not even close. The greatest influence
s were the units that demonstrated how to do it - the most notable examples in
Tal 'Afar and
Anbar being before the doctrine was fully promulgated. What does this suggest about the problem that the author asserts - about us failing to develop the right types of leaders/thinkers? Why are we
more impressed with Kilcullen than with
MacFarland, McMaster, or Patriquin?
I'm always perplexed when I see this assumption trotted out that the military has embraced COIN doctrine in our training, education, and operations, as opposed to embracing it as a neat idea that we like to talk about and mimicking specific practices that other units have had success with. Is the assumption really accurate? From what I observed, there are few leaders who get it - largely because most of them haven't spent much time trying. My observation (now a bit dated, being over a year since ETS) was that most believed that they were supposed to get it, so they would talk about it a lot. And many leaders seemed to assume that if it was being talked about, then it had been embraced and was being implemented.
Writing a doctrinal publication does not magically impart the knowledge contained within it to the force. Individuals need to read it, understand it, practice it - preferably with guided instruction - in order to fully grasp it and be able to implement it. I don't think most have gotten past step one of reading it. See
Old Blue's comment for someone with more recent and more relevant insight into how much attention junior leaders give to this doctrine...
"None will have received any formal training in the doctrine, most will never have cracked FM 3-24, and 95% will be unable to spell Galula 3 of 5 tries if spotted three letters. I am absolutely stunned at the vast number of people who have never cracked the book."
And, just to be clear, I'm talking COIN operations, not COIN skills.