A weblog of periodic insights from a former know-it-all Infantry Officer


Posted by Schmedlap at: 1:50 PM on 19 JUL 10 | Comments (7) | Reply to this post

I’m so sick of the endless bloviating on Afghanistan that I’m going to start a new feature here at Schmedlap.com. Let’s hear your gay stories from OBC, Ranger School, some FOB that you vacationed at, or dare I say it, even from Basic Training, ROTC, military school, et cetera. I find Afghanistan that boring. It has become Pornistan. Like gun porn. Just people taking in words on the page and then jerking off their words – none of it having a hint of reason behind it. Leave your tales in the comment box below or email them to me.

I’ll kick things off.

[Admin note: this is a “war story” from training, so explicit language is used throughout]

No shit. There I was. Four days into a hellish five-day “field training exercise” at Fort Benning (home of the fuckin Infantry, in case you didn’t know). My platoon trainer, who was a PT stud and always had a starched uniform, said that we were going to treat this like it was real. We were going to dig in. That’s right. Environmental restrictions be damned. We were going to dig holes. With our muthafuckin e-tools. Bad ass. And did I mention we were going to treat it like it was real? We even pulled security. We were at 50% - for each guy digging, one guy was pulling security. We stopped halfway through and went admin so that some medics could check our tender feet for blisters, but other than that it was real.

Digging in that Georgia clay, in that hot, humid weather. It was pitch dark. Mosquitos eating us alive. Sweat and camouflage running down our faces and into our eyes. Then, it’s your turn to pull security. You can barely see and it’s not made any easier by having to stare through the green lens of the PVS-7 (we didn’t get that ultra-light PVS-14). And back then we had real helmets – the old k-pots. Helmets today are all padded and comfortable. Back then, we had a helmet that was designed to be uncomfortable, like it should be. And we wore MILES halos on them for the added weight and realism.

So anyway, most of my peers are weak and they’re finger-drilling everything. But I’m actually scanning my sector, treating it like it’s real. And then I see it. Muthafucking OPFOR (opposing force). They’re trying to roll up on us. So I pass the word down the line. The loud-ass clanking of e-tools comes to a stop and is replaced by the loud mumbles of people in the platoon and the loud rustling of ALICE packs as people scramble to find their night vision. Green lights become visible in our perimeter as people turn on their night vision and fumble with them to try to mount it to their helmets. It’s like 0200 and there’s almost no moonlight, so visibility is almost zero.

OPFOR knew that we were watching them when the loud-ass clanking of e-tools was replaced by the other noises, so I knew a big fight was about to start. They started moving more slowly. I made one last check of my blank adapter, to make sure it was tight. I checked my pace count beads because, I don’t know about you, but I always lose count without those beads. And then I checked my “battle buddy” to make sure his blank adapter and MILES were squared away. My MILES harness kept going off unless the battery cap was on really tight, so I made sure he tightened that real good with his Leatherman. We all had Leatherman tools. And a roll of electrical tape on our ammo pouches instead of grenades.

It had been quite a while since I had sent out the initial alert and the rest of the platoon was dragging ass. They were still rifling through their ALICE packs and fiddle-fucking around with their night vision. I’m thinking, “whose in charge of this cluster?” The PL was still under his poncho, trying to read the map with his red lens flashlight. I still have no idea why. Then, the shit went down. OPFOR started their assault. It was like frickin D-Day. All you could hear was the crack of blank ammunition and the beeping of MILES devices and the voices of OPFOR shouting “safety kill” and cadre saying “you’re dead!” or “litter urgent!” or “sucking chest wound!” and “what are you gonna do Platoon Leader?!”

At this point, my squad leader is nowhere to be seen. My team leader is dead. My platoon leader is tangled up in his fucking poncho and his red light is shining across our fucked up perimeter. So I grab my battle buddy and round up the rest of my squad to reinforce where I think the OPFOR are going to try to flank us. I tell the machine gun team to fire the final protective line and no sooner do I tell him that when he fires right across our own fucking perimeter. He doesn’t even know what the fuck a final protective line is. So now half the platoon is dead and I’m thinking, “great, we’re not ENDEX’ing this shit until all of the casualties have been evac’d.” No fucking coincidence that the biggest guys in the platoon are always killed first.

I’m pissed at this point. I put my squad in position to defend their leg of the perimeter (it was a triangle-shaped patrol base) and I unfuck the machine gun team that just wasted 10 friendlies. I grab the acting SL of the adjacent squad and tell him to take up a position with the other machine gun team and just deny our position to the enemy. He’s saying we need to form a fucking 360 or some shit and I’m telling him, “fuck that - we’ll handle that shit on consolidation and reorganization. Right now we just need to deny this piece of fucking ground to these assholes.” So he does that and I take my team out of the perimeter to roll up the remaining OPFOR. We kill a few of them and then the other SL comes up on the net and says he’s in position. He lays suppressive fire on the OPFOR who are firing on us. I have him shift fire as my squad rolls up on them – fucking textbook battle drill.

Our cadre were pissed at the initial reaction of the platoon, but they were so fired up to see my squad take charge and unfuck it that they ENDEX’d the whole thing right there. After a brief admin period to ensure we hadn’t lost any sensitive items and to make sure nobody got bit by a spider, we had an AAR. The cadre had me walk through my decision making process from the moment that the dicked up machine gun team wasted half the platoon until the point where we rolled up the remaining OPFOR. I thought the NCOIC was gonna blow his wad in his fucking pants he was so fired up.

That was the moment when I knew I was ready to lead men into battle. If I could handle the stress while in a semi-tactical situation with MILES gear, then I knew the real deal would be a cakewalk.

Posted by Schmedlap at: 1:50 PM on 19 JUL 10 | Permalink | Comments (7) | Reply to this post

bayonet


Posted by Schmedlap at: 10:58 AM on 17 JUL 10 | Comments (11) | Reply to this post

I think I've finally reached the point where I no longer care about Iraq or Afghanistan. At least the public discussions about each one. My only remaining curiosity is whether it is worth going back into the Army.

I'm enjoying my summer - not working (other than some volunteer work), not going to school, just burning through what remains of my deployment money. But I guess I need to actually earn some money again at some point. I'd love to go back in the Army if we're going to fight. I don't want to go back if we're going to oversee redeployment and retrograde ops from a FOB in Kabul. If we're doing the latter, then I'd rather be a Wal-Mart greeter. Any predictions? I'm still watching and trying to anticipate what's going to happen.

Posted by Schmedlap at: 10:58 AM on 17 JUL 10 | Permalink | Comments (11) | Reply to this post

bayonet


Choose one: a) Politics or b) Military Service
Posted by Schmedlap at: 5:03 PM on 10 JUL 10 | Comments (6) | Reply to this post

Okay folks, the rest of the blogosphere seems to have died down (or perhaps died from the heat), so I will exploit this lull in the action to put forth my pet peeve for debate (since Colonel Yingling apparently fell asleep after challenging everyone with his pet peeve).

Here is the deal. Military service and political office do not go together.

What do I mean by that? I am not just referring to the rare instance in which someone does both simultaneously. I am referring to four situations, in descending order of egregiousness:
Serving in the military while also serving in elected office.

Serving in elected office soon after serving in the military

Serving in the military soon after serving in elected office.

Voting while in the military
Why do I see a problem with any or all of these? I will hit on the basic philosophical issue first and then hit on each situation individually.

The gist of it

My primary concerns are the health of the military profession and civil-military relations. The military is not served well if the wrong people are attracted to it. One of the most critical attributes of a servicemember is a commitment to the values of his or her service branch. Find me a set of values from one of the service branches that includes self-serving opportunism. Not in there? That is why I am concerned about the attractiveness of military service to people with political aspirations. Our military is viewed, at least partially by some and nearly wholly by others, to embody our values. Our servicemembers are easy to put on a pedestal and be declared above criticism. What an attractive prospect for someone seeking political office, particularly in a time of war.

For some recent examples of what I am getting at, consider Congressman Mark Kirk, Congressman Duncan Hunter, and former Congressional candidate Charlie Summers. How often have we heard these people invoke the phrase, “as an Iraq veteran,” or some similar phrase before asserting a semi-controversial position on an issue? When others observe the success of these candidates, military service as a means to obtaining political office becomes more attractive (Summers lost probably because he was a Republican in an anti-Republican year (2008) in a left-leaning state with no major military bases). If you join the military in order to obtain political office, are you serving the nation or are you serving yourself?

See also, my earlier post in which I typed:
You want to exacerbate problems in civil-military relations? Encourage people with political agendas to join the military. Encourage existing members of the military to run for office. Paint those in uniform who have aired no political views or aspirations as left- or right-wing, Democrat or Republican. You will create tension between the military and political parties. This will create incentives within the military to align with one party versus another to gain favor when power shifts in the government from one party to another. Rather than there being interservice rivalry, there will be political rivalry.
One of the ways in which a veteran demonstrates his bona fides is to assert himself as being on the side of the military (creating a false dichotomy of with us or against us). The individual will make foolish statements like this (why do I think this is foolish? See here). Or pork-barrel spending disguised as “helping the troops” can be advocated for because, hey, I’ve been in the shit and I know that the troops need that new umpteen million dollar jet to provide them with support if we ever invade Costa Rica. There is also the reinforcement of the perception that veterans are somehow endowed with superior judgment on military affairs than non-veterans. The last thing that we need is more group-think on Capitol Hill and more ceding of control over military budgets and long-term strategy (if we ever develop one) to people who all think like people in the Pentagon. Congress is not there to be a yes-man for the Pentagon, or a buddy, or a like-minded friend. It is supposed to be a watchdog, a frugal trustee, a stern nanny.

So that’s the gist of it. Now, the specifics.

Serving in the military while also serving in elected office.

If you don’t see a problem with this one, then you probably disagree with every word of this lengthy post. When a servicemember holds political office, that individual obtains power over the military budget, over high-ranking promotions, over various policies, and so on. In short, that individual gains authority over his superiors. That is a problem. It puts the superiors into a compromised position and puts the politician into a compromised position. Consider Senator Lindsey Graham (or Colonel Lindsey Graham - whichever you prefer). In addition to being a Senator and Air Force Reserve Colonel, he is a lawyer. If a lawyer were to represent a client and that client were his boss and the matter for which the client sought representation related to their work environment, then the lawyer would probably not be able to represent the client. Why? Because there is a likely conflict of interest. But Graham, as Senator, can hold a powerful political office, cast votes to approve promotions of General Officers appointed over him when he is Colonel Graham, cast votes upon bills that influence funding and policies that impact the ability of those Officers to do their jobs and what priorities they will take up… and that’s okay? Perhaps if the military budget were a couple orders of magnitude smaller, then we could overlook this problem. But it’s not. These are kind of high stakes.

Serving in elected office soon after serving in the military

This one is a little less egregious, but still problematic. While the prior issue goes to issues of conflict of interest in political office, this one goes to self-serving interests in the military. These are the folks who set the example for the self-serving opportunists. But I will add a caveat to this one. The issue is not about timing so much as style. If you leave the military and immediately run for public office, then that in itself is not a problem. The problem is if you tout your service as your primary qualification, or a significant qualification. That is what sets the horrible example and helps to create the perception of great potential personal gain for people who desire political office and are willing to gut out a few years in the military in order to obtain it. Probably the most outrageous example of this is the link above to (thankfully) failed candidate Charlie Summers. Summers was a Reserve Naval Officer who essentially used a low-risk deployment to the Green Zone as a taxpayer-funded campaign stunt. His wife campaigned in his place and every other sentence out of her mouth was something about her husband being in combat.

The greatest strength of our military is the quality of our personnel. That strength will be partially compromised if the military attracts more people who are only in uniform for self-serving purposes and are not dedicated to the organization and the missions that it takes on. While we cannot know the motivations of the individuals whom I named above, I think it is fairly obvious that they inspire people who do not belong in the military to join for the self-serving reasons discussed.

Stealing another quote from my recent post, this could apply to either of the issues above:
I do have a problem with people… using their military service to strengthen a weak argument…

I have long argued … that one of the problems in civil military relations is the pedestal that service members are put on. They are above criticism – which is fine when they are following lawful orders and focused on their duties. But that immunity should not extend when a servicemember sticks his or her neck into the public arena and seeks to use prior service to the country as a bludgeon to squash political opposition. This incentivizes military service for a political purpose and attracts exactly the wrong people into the armed forces. The military is about serving the country, not serving your own selfish political aspirations.

Serving in the military soon after serving in elected office

Wait a minute. Seriously? I’ve even got a problem with this? Yup, though it is less egregious than the previous issue. I would also add that, similar to the previous example, it depends more on style than timing. If you quietly step down from your position as Senator of such and such state and then join some branch of the military and you keep quiet about the fact that you were on the Used Diapers Oversight Committee or Select Committee on Misappropriations, then no problem. But if you join up and remind every superior whom you work for that you were uber-important Senator So and So, former co-chair of the Sub-Committee for Resisting Modernization of Personnel Policy, then that’s an issue. This is probably an infrequent event, but I am also throwing in here people who temporarily suspend their political duties in order to serve in the military. Hello, Congressional members of the National Guard and Reserves. I am talking about you.

Voting while in the military

I saved the best for last. Some may recall this one from my recent post:
… I think the divide between military and politics should be thick and bright. Not only should Officers not air their views publicly, I do not believe they should voice them at all, whether through advocating for a candidate or even registering with a political party. When it comes to national figures, they shouldn’t even air preferences in the privacy of a ballot booth.
Why do I take this apparently extreme view? Because it helps to reinforce the apolitical character of the Officer Corps. Your vote is silent and private, but you still make a political decision, take a political side, and act out that decision when you cast that vote. Want to vote for dog catcher or local council member? Go for it. They are not your civilian leaders, nor are they responsible for establishing your budget or influencing the policies that impact your duties. Want to vote for President? You just went too far. That guy is your Commander in Chief. You are not to take sides for or against him on political grounds. You are a servant. Vote for Governor if you are on active duty, vote for mayor if you are in any component of the military. Hold off on voting for President until you ETS.

I will recycle one more quote from my previous entry.
I seem to be a lone voice on this issue. Generally that is a sign that you’re full of crap. But it is an issue that persists in nagging at me because, while everybody seems to disagree, I have not heard any decent reason why.
Yes, that’s a challenge to you.

Posted by Schmedlap at: 5:03 PM on 10 JUL 10 | Permalink | Comments (6) | Reply to this post

bayonet


Posted by Schmedlap at: 7:44 PM on 09 JUL 10 | Comments (3) | Reply to this post

I created this, but assert no right to it. Steal this image and repost it elsewhere as often as you like.

HTML Tutorial

Posted by Schmedlap at: 7:44 PM on 09 JUL 10 | Permalink | Comments (3) | Reply to this post

bayonet


Posted by Schmedlap at: 06:53 AM on 07 JUL 10 | Comments (1) | Reply to this post

Well, well, well. C.J. Chivers sends this dispatch from Afghanistan: Examining the Complaints About American Rifle Reliability:
"The M-4 and M-16 were not seen to be suffering from reliability problems, at least not among people whose paths have crossed ours."
Wait a minute! The M4, as we all know, fails our troops daily in combat. We all know it is based upon the M16A1 fielded in Vietnam, which was notorious for jams that put troops' lives in danger, right? What the hell does C.J. Chivers know?
"... after years of carrying an M-16 (the A2 version, in the 1980s and 1990s) and years of observing them in the field, often in firefights, I have yet to see a modern M-16 or M-4 fail in the ways described in others’ reports, and I have not found significant reliability complaints from troops using the rifles in trying environments. (Interestingly ... the special operations community had dropped its program to replace M-4s with a rifle colloquially known as the SCAR... because it was not regarded as offering an upgrade on the M-4 that was worth the investment.) ... the Army’s examination of the battle of Wanat, which was part of the fuel on the latest controversy, did not find systematic problems with weapons."
How can this be?! We've all heard the stories. Right? Oh, wait a minute...
"And it is hard not to notice, as we have tried to examine the issues, that many of the complaints about M-4 and M-16 reliability are almost impossible to trace because they are either anonymous or do not include essential information, including the unit’s name, and the date and location of the failure... If there are widespread problems with the rifles, then they should be detectable in units in heavy fighting."
Oh, damn. Now I see the problem. The people complaining about the M4 are just full of shit. Now that I think about it, I would hazard a guess that most of the people who bitch about the M4 have never even had to fire a round in combat, yet they'll talk shit like they've been forced to duke it out hand-to-hand with 10 al-Qaeda operatives because of a malfunctioning M4. STFU.
"If we’ve got this wrong, or have been looking in the wrong places, help us out (my e-mail address is..."
I can't imagine what kind of BS emails he will get after making that request. I don't know what it is about this issue but it brings out the stupid in just about everyone. C.J. Chivers is a lonely voice of sanity on this issue.

See also: Quit griping about the weapon

Posted by Schmedlap at: 06:53 AM on 07 JUL 10 | Permalink | Comments (1) | Reply to this post

bayonet


Repent while there is still time
Posted by Schmedlap at: 09:25 AM on 06 JUL 10 | Comments (11) | Reply to this post

Problem with enemy-centric COIN: If there are ten insurgents and you kill four of them, you do not necessarily have six remaining. You may have twenty because the relatives of the deceased are angry at you for killing their relatives.

Solution: Conduct population-centric COIN to secure the population and marginalize the insurgents without creating more insurgents.

Wait a minute. Still, problem: Even when you protect the population, and avoid killing reconcilable insurgents, you are still fighting the original ten insurgents, plus the additional relatives, because they are eventually paid to fight against you.

Pop-COIN: 10 + 14 = 24

Enemy-COIN: 10 – 4 + 14 = 20
That is obviously a bit oversimplified, given that those driven to fight for badal will probably be a tad bit more motivated than those driven to fight for dinero. But the futility of population-centric COIN should be evident when conducting it does not lessen the capability of insurgency.

An enemy-centric approach results in killing and capturing personnel and weapons, thus reducing a finite pool of recruits from which the insurgents can draw. It also increases the demanded price for services among a populace that realizes it has a much higher chance of getting blown away when it takes up arms against the counterinsurgent. A population-centric approach merely increases the required troops on our end, increases our logistical requirements, slows the pace of our operations, and reinforces the perception among the people that they need to remain on the fence and be ready to play either side, since there is no decisive advantage being obtained by either.

One of the saints of the pop-COIN religion, Sir Robert Thompson, is widely quoted:
“What the peasant wants to know is: does the government mean to win the war? Because if not, he will have to support the insurgent.”
That is certainly true in Afghanistan. We insist on moving into areas temporarily and then leaving; or moving into areas and demonstrating our inability to meet the needs or demands of the populace. There is an expectation that areas will return to Taliban control. So the people must sit on the fence and be ready to cooperate with the insurgents when they return. So what is the utility of pop-COIN? Are we gleaning better intelligence because of our demonstrated willingness to protect the population? Not likely. Who wants to be outed as an informant when ISAF leaves the village and the Taliban return?

Both approaches have their utility, METT-TC dependent. It seems quite a leap of faith to think that Afghanistan is an appropriate venue for a country-wide, population-centric approach.

One thing that I think many people forget about Iraq (or maybe it wasn't reported?) is that in 2007 and 2008 we were killing and capturing lots of people on a nightly basis. Protecting the populace was A priority. When speaking to the folks back home, in order to sell the war, perhaps we said that it was the priority. But on the ground, I do not recall a single Commander's Update Brief spending any time at all discussing what we had done to protect anyone. We were focused on punching al-Qaeda in the nuts at every opportunity and dismantling their networks. The reconcilables got the message loud and clear that they could take money and jobs in return for cooperation, or they would die a swift death when we came knocking down their doors in the middle of the night. The rest of the populace made it clear to them that they should take the offer. The only protection that the population got from us was good fire discipline so that we did not kill non-combatants. We made it clear that the government intended to win this thing and we did not send that message by delivering governance or digging wells. We shot motherfuckers in the face.

Pop-COIN blasphemers, your scripture is false teaching. Here is some truth:
To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven:
A time to be born, and a time to die; a time to plant, and a time to pluck up that which is planted;
A time to kill, and a time to heal; a time to break down, and a time to build up;

- Ecclesiastes 3:1-3 (KJV)
It's time to kill.
Posted by Schmedlap at: 09:25 AM on 06 JUL 10 | Permalink | Comments (11) | Reply to this post

bayonet


If the media doesn't get it, how will they teach the unwashed masses?
Posted by Schmedlap at: 09:44 AM on 05 JUL 10 | Comments (14) | Reply to this post

I just read Petraeus advisor predicts changes in Afghan strategy in yesterday's LA Times and I think the author, Doyle McManus, misinterpreted David Kilcullen.

Here is the passage that I am referring to.
"The rules have been interpreted too restrictively," Kilcullen said. "They've been too legalistic — and also too apologetic." That's a significant statement from a man who has condemned U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan for causing civilian casualties, and whose latest book, "Counterinsurgency," lists "respect for noncombatants" as a fundamental principle of irregular warfare.
It's tough to tell in the selective quotation of Kilcullen, but I think the author got it wrong. McManus points out that this is "a significant statement." Why? Apparently McManus seems to think this is a deviation of sorts by Kilcullen. He highlights the contrast of this statement with earlier ones by pointing out that Kilcullen has "condemned U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan for causing civilian casualties," and his assertion that "respect for noncombatants" is "a fundamental principle of irregular warfare."

I'm pretty sure that the quoted passage is not a contrast to those statements. I'm pretty sure it was unrelated. I am fairly certain that Kilcullen's views are unchanged and that he sees no conflict between his statement to McManus and his earlier quoted statements. Kilcullen is pointing out what many of us have recognized for quite a while. The ROE are not the problem. The inability of layers of command to interpret those ROE into something coherent on the ground and/or the inability of troops on the ground to work within the interpretation of the ROE - that's the problem. Commanders are interpreting the ROE too restrictively and too incoherently. Many Soldiers prefer to rely upon their ability to bring overwhelming firepower to bear, rather than the more difficult and necessary work of using greater restraint and employing organic firepower with greater precision - and then they bitch about it when they're required to do the more difficult task.

Example, see this passage from the infamous Rolling Stone article...
"The rules handed out here are not what McChrystal intended – they've been distorted as they passed through the chain of command – but knowing that does nothing to lessen the anger of troops on the ground. 'Fuck, when I came over here and heard that McChrystal was in charge, I thought we would get our fucking gun on,' says Hicks, who has served three tours of combat. 'I get COIN. I get all that. McChrystal comes here, explains it, it makes sense. But then he goes away on his bird, and by the time his directives get passed down to us through Big Army, they're all fucked up – either because somebody is trying to cover their ass, or because they just don't understand it themselves. But we're fucking losing this thing.'"
The rest of the media doesn't seem to get this distinction. Until the media understands it, they will remain unable to convey this to the public. And until that happens, you'll have a public largely made up of people who express anger at our leaders for "tying our troops' hands."

One of the reasons that the administration has seen fit to use organizations such as CNAS to market a kinder, gentler way of war is that the American public is poorly informed about what contemporary operations require. There is nothing kind or gentle about shooting a guy in the face. That is what our troops need to be doing: shooting people in the face (or in the neck or chest, if you're concerned about identifying the deceased). They also need to avoid wasting people who are not combatants. But the public thinks that COIN is about not shooting bad guys and about "winning hearts and minds" through short-term projects. Once again, the media fails in its task to inform.

Focused exclusively on getting insider scoops and tabloid scandals, the media manages to get the basics wrong day after day after day. And we wonder why public support wanes. We wonder why the President can't put together a coherent strategy without offending half of our population. Do you people understand, yet, why I despise the so-called journalism profession? What a bunch of assclowns.

Posted by Schmedlap at: 09:44 AM on 05 JUL 10 | Permalink | Comments (14) | Reply to this post

bayonet