A weblog of periodic insights from a former know-it-all Infantry Officer


Now begins the sisterhood of the traveling combat utility trousers
Posted by Schmedlap at: 4:35 PM on 06 MAR 10 | Comments (1) | Reply to this post

Small Wars Journal linked to a story (In Afghan War, Letting Women Reach Women, via NYT) about Female Engagement Teams that the Marine Corps is fielding in Afghanistan.
... 40 young women are preparing to deploy to Afghanistan in one of the more forward-leaning experiments of the American military... 'female engagement teams,' the military’s name for four- and five-member units that will accompany men on patrols in Helmand Province to try to win over the rural Afghan women who are culturally off limits to outside men. The teams, which are to meet with the Afghan women in their homes, assess their need for aid and gather intelligence... [ISAF] officers say that you cannot gain the trust of the Afghan population if you only talk to half of it.
I remember receiving a check-the-block "cultural awareness" briefing prior to OIF I that was administered not at the unit level, but at the installation level. Thus, the audience was a mix of all specialties, ranks, and included male and female. Units simply had to make sure their Soldiers attended it at some point as part of the checklist of items in our "readiness processing" packets. It was not a horrible briefing, but certainly inadequate by today's standards.

One part of that briefing stuck out as I read the above article. The Major (Assistant Division G-5, if I recall correctly) giving the briefing asked, "how many independent ladies we got in the audience?" Several female Soldiers raised their hands. "Okay, here's the deal," he began, "when you're in Kuwait or Iraq, don't be independent. And for the men in the audience, don't talk to the local women."

If that was the perception of Iraq, then it was certainly the opinion of Afghanistan at the time - perhaps even more so. However, it appears that the women in Afghanistan are a little more "independent" than some first thought. The article went on to state that...
Marines who have worked with the ad hoc teams in Afghanistan said that rural Afghan women, rarely seen by outsiders, had more influence in their villages than male commanders might think, and that the Afghan women’s good will could make Afghans, both men and women, less suspicious of American troops.
I have long suspected this. As I said in my comment at the SWJ blog, some things are universal. A man - in any country - will always claim that "in my house, what I say goes." In reality, once he goes home, his wife is telling him to take out the trash and fix that leaky faucet. If the man - in any country - knows what is good for him, he shuts up and does as he is told. I saw in Iraq and always suspected it to be the case in Afghanistan. This reaffirms my hunch.

Posted by Schmedlap at: 4:35 PM on 06 MAR 10 | Permalink | Comments (1) | Reply to this post

bayonet


It is what it isn't
Posted by Schmedlap at: 6:03 PM on 02 MAR 10 | Comments (12) | Reply to this post

Today a smart, well-traveled, experienced, knowledgeable guy was telling me that "rule of law" is a concept that we need to stop worrying about. Strongly disagreeing, I asked why. After he explained why, it became clear that he was working with a significantly different definition of "rule of law" than I knew of. It reminded me of recent discussions here and elsewhere over definitions of culture, torture, and terrorism. Given his definition of "rule of law" I agreed that it is not something that we need to worry about. If "rule of law" = his definition, then rule of law is not important. If "rule of law" = my definition, then rule of law is important.

Just curious, what is your understanding of what "rule of law" means? (And feel free to cite as many definitions as you wish if you want to poo-poo someone else's definition).

Posted by Schmedlap at: 6:03 PM on 02 MAR 10 | Permalink | Comments (12) | Reply to this post

bayonet


Painting stripes on a horse doesn't make it a zebra
Posted by Schmedlap at: 5:16 PM on 25 FEB 10 | Comments (44) | Reply to this post

If this thread goes as planned, then the comment section will be unpredictable. Believe it or not, this will culminate with a point about Afghanistan. Maybe you will think that your time has been wasted if you read that far. I don’t know. Reader beware. End disclaimer.

Complex systems exist within a cultural context. To take a few examples of what I mean by a “complex system” consider the legal system, the educational system, or the health care system (to the extent there is one). How well these systems function is not dependent upon how well their design meets the specifications of some universal standard. There is no universal standard. Our legal system works as poorly or as well as it does because of how compatible it is with our culture. Transpose the French legal system onto American society and the result will not be pretty because it is inappropriate. Ditto education and health care.

Different values, norms, and beliefs create different expectations, demands, and preferences for what is required to satisfy the end users of those systems. Some conservative talk radio hosts like to point out shortcomings in the British health care system. Those features certainly sound undesirable to me. But are they undesirable to the Brits? I don’t know. Ditto Canada’s system. Are those shortcomings due to inherent flaws in those systems? Or are they simply a reflection of demand and expectation? I don’t know. Left wing folks like to point to France’s system of universal care and lower costs and they point out that doctors serve a role similar to what we use Paramedics for in this country. Would that work here in the US? I don’t know. What I do know is this: both of the following statements are crappy reasoning…
Crappy reasoning example #1: The British have a health care system that has a significant number of attributes in common with what Congress is proposing. Therefore, Congress is proposing a bad plan.

Crappy reasoning example #2: The French have a health care system that has a significant number of attributes in common with what Congress is proposing. Therefore, Congress is proposing a good plan.
Those statements are crappy reasoning because there is no reason to believe that Britain’s system will work similarly in the US as it does in Britain and there is no reason to believe that France’s system will work similarly in the US as it does in France. We are different people.

Systems of administration must function within an organizational culture. By systems of administration, I mean the internal transactional processes of an organization, such as the staff planning and orders production within a military headquarters, the account updates and transfers within a bank, or the process of soliciting, collecting, and analyzing contract bids at a government agency. Pull a bunch of tenured professors from their positions of limited academic independence and put them into a military staff where they have zero independence and see how well that staff functions. Take a bunch of short-haul truck drivers who operate with informal rules about accounting for containers and offloading procedures and then put them in a bank where everything is standardized and technical and see how well that works. Take a group of small businessmen who rely on gut decisions and personal relationships to make judgments and put them into a federal contracting office and see how well that goes.

So where am I going with this nonsense? I am just curious whether we have our assumptions straight on Afghanistan. Specifically…
1. Are we creating a central Afghan government modeled after what we think is appropriate, based on our cultural dispositions? Or are we helping Afghanistan to craft something that resembles something that existed in 1972, with some improvements added in based upon historical lessons about why that government failed? The former, to me, would be like trying to transpose France's legal system or government onto our society. That would require an entire blogroll of FAIL Blogs to adequately monitor.

2. Are we creating an ANA in the image of our Army or Marines, that functions well when staffed with aggressive, ambitious, type-A American men? Or are we creating an ANA that will function well if staffed with Afghans who just want a job? The former would be like trying to take a bunch of tenured professors and putting them in cubicles to make mindless PowerPoint presentations all day, everyday. I suspect they would begin reliving their carefree undergrad days by "occupying" the TOC and issuing demands.
Feel free to offer facts or other input in response to those questions or to offer reactions to anything else.

(Am I writing this because I am procrastinating on something else? Damn right.)

Posted by Schmedlap at: 5:16 PM on 25 FEB 10 | Permalink | Comments (44) | Reply to this post

bayonet


Posted by Schmedlap at: 8:15 PM on 20 FEB 10 | Comments (12) | Reply to this post

Marines shield Afghan father and child:

H/t @BrandonF.

Posted by Schmedlap at: 8:15 PM on 20 FEB 10 | Permalink | Comments (12) | Reply to this post

bayonet


Reported to be in critical condition
Posted by Schmedlap at: 7:26 PM on 19 FEB 10 | Comments (12) | Reply to this post

Alexander Haig is reported to be in critical condition at Johns Hopkins Hospital. For those of you wondering, "who the heck is that?" - he was a bad motherfucker. That's who.

When I was in military school, one of our grizzled old TAC NCOs was a Vietnam Veteran who served with 1-26 IN and fought at the Battle of Ap Gu. He spoke very highly of his battalion commander, Alexander Haig, on several occasions and personally credited him with not only winning that battle, but doing so with far fewer casualties than would be expected.

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

Citation:

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Distinguished Service Cross to Alexander M. Haig, Jr. (0-50790), Lieutenant Colonel (Armor), U.S. Army, for extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations involving conflict with an armed hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam, while serving with while serving with Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division. Lieutenant Colonel Haig distinguished himself by exceptionally valorous actions on 31 March and 1 April 1967 while serving as battalion commander during an attack by a numerically superior Viet Cong force near Ap Gu. When two of his companies were engaged by a large hostile force, Colonel Haig landed amid a hail of fire, personally took charge of the units, called for artillery and air fire support, and succeeded in soundly defeating the insurgent force. Before dawn the nest day, when a single mortar round fell near the perimeter, Colonel Haig recognized it as the registering round prior to a massive attack and immediately alerted his entire unit. Within five minutes a barrage of 400 rounds was fired by the Viet Cong, but it was ineffective because of the warning and preparations by Colonel Haig. As the barrage subsided, a force three times larger than his began a series of human wave assaults on the camp. Heedless of the danger to himself, Colonel Haig repeatedly braved intense hostile fire to survey the battlefield. His personal courage and determination, and his skillful employment of every defense and support tactic possible, inspired his men to fight with previously unimagined power. Although his force was outnumbered three to one, Colonel Haig succeeded in inflicting 592 casualties on the Viet Cong. Lieutenant Colonel Haig's extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army.
Headquarters, US Army, Vietnam, General Orders No. 2318 (May 22, 1967)

Source for DSC citation

Posted by Schmedlap at: 7:26 PM on 19 FEB 10 | Permalink | Comments (12) | Reply to this post

bayonet


Posted by Schmedlap at: 1:12 PM on 19 FEB 10 | Comments (0) | Reply to this post

Frontline usually does a decent job. This looks interesting. Spoiler alert: the video doesn't show how it ends.

I think it airs on the 23rd.

Posted by Schmedlap at: 1:12 PM on 19 FEB 10 | Permalink | Comments (0) | Reply to this post

bayonet


While we discuss the various parts of it, these guys are seeing it
Posted by Schmedlap at: 10:04 AM on 15 FEB 10 | Comments (1) | Reply to this post

Soldiers move under fire in Helmand

Posted by Schmedlap at: 10:04 AM on 15 FEB 10 | Permalink | Comments (1) | Reply to this post

bayonet